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Contemporary Conceptions of Customary International Law
law rules to construe treaties. For example, when determining the ownership of submerged
lands, they have done so with regard to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention; in construing
the Warsaw Convention, they have applied the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
And, finally, at points the U.S. Supreme Court will use international norms to construe the
U.S. Constitution. For example, there is currently a split in the death penalty jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court about whether international standards on the death penalty should or
should not be applied in the context of determining what constitutes Eighth Amendment
cruel and unusual punishment."
What the revisionists miss is that there are many subtle ways in which judicial
techniques act to internalize customary norms into U.S. domestic law, even without political
branch action and even outside the human rights context. So if the revisionist claim that only
political branch action can authorize judicial incorporation of international law were taken
seriously, it would have very damaging effects on the coherence of federal law, not to
mention executive power and original intent.
I will conclude with two points. First, if the question is "What does internalization mean
for contemporary conceptions of customary international law?", I would say that we should
focus less on state practice and more on opinio juris. How is opinio juris reflected in
domestic law? How do we know opiniojuris when we see it? What roles do NGOs play in
promoting it? What do bureaucratic procedures do to bring about opiniojuris? Second, if
the question is, "How does legal normativity foster compliance?", my answer would be that
normativity fosters compliance through obedience, namely, through the transnational legal
process of internalization of international norms into domestic law.
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
by S. James Anaya"
In my remarks I want to address the relation between international institutions and the
formation of customary international law, particularly in the field of human rights. Since the
mid-twentieth century, the United Nations and other international institutions, through
numerous functional agencies, have generated more and more activity within the field of
human rights. This activity includes information gathering on numerous human rights-related
matters, the articulation of human rights standards through the adoption of declarations and
the drafting of treaties, and the adjudication of specific human rights controversies. A
perennial concern of international legal scholars has been to understand the relation between
such activities and the development of international law. As just noted, much of the work
of international institutions in the field of human rights is connected with or gives rise to
multilateral treaties. Of course, to the extent that international human rights treaties are
developed and states ratify them, the treaties themselves automatically give rise to
obligations within international law.
My immediate concern, however, is with understanding the activities of international
institutions, not primarily in relation to treaty-based obligations but rather in relation to the
development of customary international law. Under traditional theory, a rule of customary
international law is deemed to arise as a result of a pattern of actual behavior on the part of
states that reflects conformity with the rule. What counts fundamentally is not rhetoric, such
as statements made before international bodies, but state practice in the form of actual
"Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1987) (plurality opinion), with Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
'Special Counsel, Indian Law Resource Center, Albuquerque, NM; Professor of Law,
University of Iowa.
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conduct on the part of states in their international relations. Within this traditional view,
customary international law exists, or "crystallizes," when a pattern of state behavior
generates a certain threshold of understanding about the content of a rule, along with
widespread manifestations of consent to be bound to the rule, this sense of obligation being
the so-called opiniojuris.
For the most part, the multiple and increasingly pervasive activities of international
institutions in the field of human rights do not fit neatly into the categories of state practice
under the traditional conception of customary international law. Nonetheless, as many have
observed, these activities are often the source of normative understandings that, like or along
with those generated by traditional state practice, carry weight in the international system
independently of specific treaty regimes. With this phenomenon of the contemporary
international legal order, we are encouraged to look beyond the traditional concept of custom
in international law. It is not my purpose here to provide a comprehensive theory of
customary law. Rather, I will simply identify a number of factors that drive and inform an
assessment of the multiple activities of international institutions and their contribution to the
formation of human rights norms that can be understood as customary international law.
First, international human rights principles that carry weight independently of specific
treaty obligations have been generated through international institutions quite apart from the
actual conduct of states in particular cases. The UN processes leading to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other subsequent declarations have involved multilateral
discussions that have had their focus on what ought to be rather than what is. Since the
adoption of the Universal Declaration fifty years ago, states have convened regularly in
multilateral settings, along with other authoritative actors, to discuss problems of human
rights and to articulate relevant standards. Through such processes, normative
understandings and expectations of behavior in compliance with the articulated standards
have reached certain levels of generality, notwithstanding continuing conduct on the part of
states that is at odds with the standards.
Second, there is an element of what might be called normative spillover in the activities
of international institutions that are focused on human rights. That is, certain basic, already
widely accepted human rights principles inevitably form the backdrop of multilateral
discussions concerning human rights. These include human rights principles articulated in
the UN Charter such as the basic principles of equality, nondiscrimination, and self-
determination. Thus, for example, when discussion about the rights of women occurs, the
basic principle of equality informs that discussion, and that basic principle has spillover into
the articulation of the more particularized norms that relate to an understanding of the rights
of women. When discussion about the rights of indigenous peoples occurs, the normative
essence of the principle of self-determination-which is simply that people have the right
to control their own lives and destinies-has certain spillover to an understanding of the
rights of indigenous peoples. If it is indeed a principle of human rights that people should
be able to control their own lives on an equal basis, then it follows more easily that
indigenous peoples should be able to retain and develop their own cultural expressions and
methods of organization.
A third factor, especially observable in the area of human rights, is a shift in the source
of obligation from consent to consensus. The obligation to uphold human rights is less and
less a matter of affirmative consent to human rights norms on the part of states, and more
and more a matter of consensus on the part of the participants in the norm-building and norm
application processes. As human rights are discussed within international institutions, what
seems to be carrying the day is the consensus that emerges from the multilateral discourse.
We can readily observe that the international actors in an institutional setting do not always
wait for an indication of affirmative consent on the part of a state to a human rights norm
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before they hold that state accountable under the norm. To the extent that there is a
consensus, for example, on the right not to be tortured, the international community can be
seen as willing to act upon that right independently of some affirmative act of state consent.
Further, in limited instances one might observe the international community acting
notwithstanding the express withholding of consent to a particular norm.
A final factor I want to note has to do with the theme of this conference. That factor is
the enhanced participation of non-state actors, both in the formation of a consensus about
norms and in their invocation and application. International institutions have provided
individuals, independent experts, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) various
avenues of access to international decision making in regard to human rights matters. Such
non-state actors have thus participated in the development of normative consensus, often
causing it to progress at a much faster pace than it might otherwise and to reflect more fully
the values and perspectives of non-state actors. Again, the example of indigenous peoples
is instructive. Indigenous peoples themselves have been involved in the activities of the
United Nations and other international institutions concerning their rights and status in the
contemporary world. The pace of the development of the emerging standards is heavily
influenced by, and the content of the standards substantially reflects, indigenous peoples'
own articulated aspirations and demands. Such impact of non-state actors on the norm-
building process is a factor that, along with the others I have pointed out, influences how we
should today understand the dynamics of customary international law.
With these factors in mind, what can we say about the activities of international
institutions in the field of human rights and customary international law? For starters, even
under traditional theory, the activities of the United Nations and other international
institutions are capable of contributing to the development of customary international law
regarding human rights. The statements and resolutions within international organizations
about human rights may prompt patterns of state behavior, and in that way lead to customary
international law. In other words, under traditional theory a resolution concerning the rights
of women or a resolution concerning the rights of indigenous peoples is not itself customary
international law, but may nonetheless prompt behavior consistent with that resolution which
in turn may result in new customary international law. Also, under the traditional view, a
resolution or statement by or from within an international institution may provide evidence
of customary international law to the extent that such a resolution or statement reflects what
states already believe their obligations to be. These are fairly noncontroversial descriptions
of the significance of multilateral communications and resolutions within international
institutions in terms of customary international law.
However, I believe it is not sufficient to describe the elaboration of resolutions or other
communicative activities of international institutions simply as precursory to or evidence of
customary international law. Rather, I think it is possible to say that such resolutions and
activities themselves generate customary international law. As I have pointed out, the
multiple activities of international institutions in the field of human rights themselves build
understanding and consensus about norms, and they do so upon a foundation of already
widely accepted principles. As consensus about the content of a human rights norm emerges
among the various relevant actors in the world community, including non-state actors, so too
does expectation of compliance with the norm. Consensus on the content of a rule against
child abuse, for example, tends strongly to be accompanied by expectation that the rule will
be followed, apart from any specific agreement to be bound by the rule. And this expectation
endows the rule with an obligatory character that manifests itself and is enhanced through
further deliberative activities within international institutions.
In sum, the multiple activities of international institutions not only matter in a political
or sociological sense but, to the extent that they build understanding and expectations
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regarding human rights norms, they also can be seen as contributing to the formation of
customary international law.
THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF CUSTOMIARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
by Hilary Charlesworth*
The title of this paper is of course drawn from Milan Kundera's wonderful 1984 novel
The Unbearable Lightness ofBeing. I wanted to evoke some elements of Kundera's book,
especially the choice he gives to his central characters between weight and lightness-moral
responsibility on the one hand, vacuousness on the other. I also wanted to evoke Kundera's
playful reversal and undermining of the categories of weight and lightness.
Customary international law is a paradigm of the tension between apology and utopia
that Martti Koskenniemi has diagnosed in international legal discourse.' The positivist
account of custom is an apologetic one, in which the actions of states are simply justified by
legal norms. In his stem critique of"relative normativity," Prosper Weil presented customary
law as a type of Trojan horse by which the homogenous normativity of traditional
international law was threatened.2 For Weil, distinguishing between customary norms
(through, for example, the doctrines of jus cogens and rights erga omnes) radically
undermined the purposes of the international legal system, which Weil defined as securing
coexistence and cooperation among the states making up the international community.'
Customary international law, then, was a dangerously manipulable, unbearably light source
of international norms.
But custom also has utopian potential. Many jurists regard custom as a useful
mechanism that can compensate for the rigidity of treaty law, and have argued for expansion
of the category. For example, Louis Sohn has suggested (as has S. James Anaya in his panel
presentation) that customary rules can emerge by virtue of the treaty negotiation process,
even before the treaty is signed.4 Isabelle Gunning has gone further and argued that, at least
in the area of human rights, the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) should
be regarded as constituting relevant practice in the generation of customary norms.5 On such
an analysis, custom is not light, but a weighty, important source of international law.
I want to consider only a fragment of this panel's ambitious agenda, linking the two
perspectives we were asked to address. Will the increased participation of non-state actors
in the generation of customary norms affect compliance with those norms?
For a positivist such as Weil, the answer would be straightforward. A positivist account
of customary law locates its normative force in the voluntarism that gave it birth. Thus,
custom, that curious (and circular6) amalgam of "state practice" and opiniojuris, binds
because states have agreed to be bound by it.' In this sense, compliance is a precondition for
custom. Custom derived from sources such as "world order values" is seen as undermining
*Director, Centre for International and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National
University, Canberra.
IMARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGuMENT 363 (1989)
2Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AJIL 413 (1983).
31d. at 418-19.4Louis Sohn, "Generally Accepted" International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1073 (1986).
'lsabelle Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human
Rights, 31 VA. 1. INT'L L. 211 (1991).
6Koskenniemi, supra note 1.
7Weil, supra note 1, at 433.
